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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From the hundreds of trademark cases decided in any year, it is 
often difficult to discern any particular theme.  There are cases from 
many different areas raising very disparate issues.  In 2010, however, 
trademark dilution stands out as the area with the most prominent 
doctrinal opinions.  In addition to three court of appeals decisions,1 there 
were five significant Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) 
decisions2 from an entity whose prior involvement in dilution had been 
 
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School.  © 2011 by David S. Welkowitz. 
 1. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. 
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011). 
 2. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 
2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme 
Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Am. Express Mktg. & Dev. 
Corp. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Fiat Grp. Autos., S.p.A. v. 
ISM, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Citigroup, Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. 
Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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very much the exception.  These dilution opinions form the centerpiece 
of this discussion. 
There were, of course, other notable decisions involving 
contributory infringement3 and the continuing saga of Google 
AdWords.4  For good measure, there is a small detour into the related 
field of rights of publicity and the issue of what constitutes commercial 
speech.5  But, first things first, and dilution deserves to be front and 
center this year. 
II.  THE RETURN (REVENGE?) OF VICTORIA’S SECRET 
Probably not since the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Moseley 
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.6 has dilution been in the forefront of judicial 
decision making in trademark law.  The Court’s decision, interpreting 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”)7 to require a 
showing of “actual dilution,” as opposed to likelihood of dilution, set in 
motion a concerted effort to amend the statute.  That effort resulted in 
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”),8 which 
changed the operative standard to likelihood of dilution and added new 
definitions of a “famous” mark,9 “dilution by blurring,”10 and “dilution 
by tarnishment.”11  Ironically, however, the Supreme Court’s decision 
did not bring finality to the case before it, involving Victoria’s Secret 
and a store in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, originally called “Victor’s 
Secret,” then changed to “Victor’s Little Secret.”12  The Court remanded 
the case to the Sixth Circuit,13 which took no action for four years before 
remanding it back to the District Court.14  By that time, the TDRA had 
 
 3. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 647 (2010). 
 4. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Utah 2010); 
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 5. See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Dryer v. 
Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 6. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) 
(amended 2006)). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 12. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 434. 
 14. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (D. Ky. 2008), aff’d, 605 
F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011). 
2
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replaced the FTDA, changing the operative language of the statute.15  
The District Court reexamined the case under the TDRA.  The court 
determined that there was no likelihood of dilution by blurring but that 
there was a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment.16   
The Sixth Circuit affirmed on appeal.17  However, its rationale for 
upholding the tarnishment claim merits particular scrutiny.18  The court 
held that there would be a rebuttable presumption19 of a likelihood of 
dilution by tarnishment20 where the unauthorized use of a famous mark 
was a use in a sexual context.  The court justified its creation of the 
presumption by citing a number of cases in which sexually oriented uses 
had been found tarnishing.21  Although the presumption is rebuttable, it 
is unclear how, absent a well-conducted survey, one could successfully 
rebut the presumption. 
There was a forceful dissent in the case by Judge Moore.22  She 
found the evidence put forth by Victoria’s Secret to be inadequate to 
demonstrate a likelihood of harm to the reputation of its mark.23  More 
critically, she questioned the basis for assuming, as the majority did, that 
any sexually based use would necessarily be likely to cause such harm:  
“That a consumer may associate a negative-sounding junior mark with a 
famous mark says little of whether the consumer views the junior mark 
as harming the reputation of the famous mark.”24 
Although conceding that it was possible that such harm would 
occur, she pointed to the statutory standard that requires a likelihood of 
dilution and asserted that Victoria’s Secret had not demonstrated that 
harm was more likely than not to occur.25  Finally, she noted that 
 
 15. Id. at 737-38.  Had the Sixth Circuit remanded the case immediately, the case would have 
been decided under the more restrictive standard of the FTDA. 
 16. Id. at 749-50. 
 17. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1003 (2011). 
 18. Id. (affirming the judgment of the District Court but did not discuss the dilution by 
blurring claim).  
 19. Id. (Gibbons, J., concurring).  The concurring judge preferred (preferring to call it an 
inference, rather than a presumption).  Id.  The difference is not trivial, since there is no requirement 
that an unrebutted inference be accepted.  But one would expect most courts to accept the inference.  
Id. 
 20. Id. at 385, 387-88. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 391 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 392 (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 110 (2d 
Cir. 2009)). 
 25. Id. at 394. 
3
Welkowitz: Trademarks in 2010 (and 2011)
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
9- WELKOWITZ_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 5/25/2012  1:14 PM 
48 AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL [6:45 
Victoria’s Secret had cultivated a less than wholesome reputation and 
stated that this should be relevant in the analysis.26 
To determine whether dilution by tarnishment or blurring is likely 
to occur is a very difficult task.  The TDRA’s factors for blurring have 
not been applied consistently by courts, and the statute does not list any 
factors to guide the tarnishment analysis.27  Thus, it is interesting that the 
Sixth Circuit chose to create a simpler decision path by creating a 
presumption.28  Whether the presumption is factually well-founded is a 
separate question.  The fact that several courts have held sexually 
oriented uses to be tarnishing29 may say more about the sensibilities of 
courts faced with sexually oriented uses than the actual harm to the 
reputations of famous marks.  Nevertheless, the court’s holding may 
signal a new wave of decisions designed to simplify and unify the 
analysis of dilution.30  It will be interesting to see whether future courts 
create new presumptions, especially for drug-oriented parodies of 
famous marks.31 
III.  WHEN IS EVISA NOT A VISA? 
A second court of appeals decision, this one from the Ninth Circuit, 
examined blurring in the context of common word trademarks.32  JSL 
Corporation operated eVisa, which was run via the website 
www.evisa.com.33  According to the eVisa website, eVisa is a 
“multilingual education and information business.”34  Apparently JSL 
Corporation used the name eVisa “to suggest ‘the ability to travel, both 
linguistically and physically, through the English speaking world.’”35  
Visa International Service Association, which owns the VISA credit card 
mark, sued JSL, claiming trademark dilution by blurring.  Because JSL 
 
 26. Id. at 395. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 28. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 385.  This is not the first presumption to be created 
for dilution.  Prior to the TDRA, some courts presumed that if the marks used by each side were 
identical then there was a presumption of actual dilution.  See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 
F.3d 439, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 (2005). 
 29. Some of the citations by the Sixth Circuit were to cases decided under state dilution laws.  
However, it is not clear that the TDRA’s definition of tarnishment is fundamentally different than 
the implicit definition used in those cases. 
 30. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 390. 
 31. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo USA, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (N.D. Ill. 
1989); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 32. Visa Int’l Serv. Assn. v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 33. Id. at 1089.   
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
4
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conceded that the VISA mark was famous prior to the first use of eVisa 
and that eVisa was used in commerce, the only issue in the case was 
likelihood of dilution.36  Although the TDRA contains six factors to 
assist courts when analyzing blurring, the Ninth Circuit did not look to 
those factors.37  The court held that the eVisa mark was “effectively 
identical” to the VISA mark.38  That holding, plus the court’s conclusion 
that “Visa is a strong trademark,” was sufficient for the court to permit 
entry of summary judgment.39  The notion that use of an identical mark 
will normally suffice to show dilution predates the TDRA; the Second 
Circuit has held that it created a presumption of dilution sufficient to 
satisfy the more stringent “actual dilution” standard under the original 
FTDA.40 
But that was not all there was to the case.  JSL claimed that because 
“visa” is a common word and because eVisa invoked the common 
meaning of the word, it was insulated from dilution liability.41  The court 
rejected this argument for essentially two reasons.  First, Visa’s use of 
the word as a mark was sufficiently distinct from the common definition 
of the word to make it sufficiently unique for dilution protection.42  
Thus, the court focused in part on the famous trademark owner’s 
distinctiveness.43 
Second, the court found that eVisa “is not using the word visa for 
its literal dictionary definition.”44  Such a use might well insulate it from 
liability.  However, the eVisa business was also distinct from the “visa” 
business, making eVisa a mark that stood on its own.45  It is not clear 
whether a trademark use, that nevertheless directly invoked the 
dictionary definition of the term, would be deemed actionable by the 
court.  The TDRA clearly excludes non-trademark uses of descriptive 
terms from liability, something the court did not discuss.  Whether the 
court would extend the same principle to a trademark use cannot be 
 
 36. Id. at 1090. 
 37. Id. at 1090, 1091. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
822 (2005).  The Ninth Circuit also referred to this concept.  See Visa Int’l Serv. Assn., 610 F.3d at 
1090 (use identical marks as “circumstantial evidence” of dilution) (citing Horphag Research Ltd. v. 
Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 41. Visa Int’l Serv. Assn., 610 F.3d at 1091. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 1089-90.  
 44. Id. at 1092. 
 45. Id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“fair use” of a famous mark in a 
descriptive, non-trademark manner is not actionable). 
5
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determined.  Also unclear is the relation between this case and a parody 
use, such as the one in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity 
Dog, LLC,46 where the Fourth Circuit denied relief from a trademark use 
that parodied the Louis Vuitton trademark. 
IV.  SIMILARITY REDUX 
It has long been regarded as axiomatic that in order to be likely to 
cause dilution of a well-known mark, a second user’s mark must be 
“substantially similar” to the well-known mark.  Thus, substantial 
similarity has been a threshold requirement, the absence of which has 
been regarded as fatal to a dilution claim.  However, recent cases have 
held that when Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006, it changed the applicable standard of similarity.47 
The latest case on this topic is from the Ninth Circuit, Levi Strauss 
& Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.48  Until Levi Strauss, the 
Ninth Circuit adhered to a standard that required a showing that the two 
marks at issue were “identical or nearly identical” to support a dilution 
claim.49  Even after the TDRA, the Ninth Circuit had referred to, and 
apparently applied, its “identical or nearly identical” standard.50  
However, in Levi Strauss, the Ninth Circuit decided to reexamine its 
prior precedent in light of the language of the TDRA.51 
The court first traced its use of the existing standard, noting its 
origins in state law and its consonance with the original language of the 
FTDA.52  The court then examined the language of the TDRA, pointing 
to the fact that it constituted a wholesale revision of the FTDA.53  It 
examined its post-TDRA case law, concluding that none of the cases 
 
 46. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
 47. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 48. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d 1158.  The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board also has weighed in 
on this issue.  See infra Part V. 
 49. E.g., Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002), 
superceded by statute, as stated in Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1162. 
 50. See, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Assn. v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the 
marks here are effectively identical”); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 635 (9th Cir. 
2008); Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 51. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1162-66. 
 52. Id. at 1163-65. 
 53. Id. at 1165-66. 
6
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“presented or squarely resolved” whether the prior standard continued to 
apply under the TDRA.54 
Having decided to reexamine the issue, the court compared the 
language of the original FTDA with the TDRA.  The TDRA 
incorporates similarity in the definition of blurring, requiring an 
association “arising from the similarity between [the famous mark and 
the second mark].”55  It does not expressly require “substantial” 
similarity or any other additional similarity.56  Further, the court noted 
that the first of the statutory factors listed as possible guides to finding 
dilution is the “degree of similarity” between the two marks—again with 
no added qualifier.57  Although no qualifier appears in the original 
FTDA, the term “similarity” was also absent from the original 
definition58 (there were no factors under the original statute either), and 
the court believed that “Congress did not wish to be tied to the language 
or interpretation of prior law.”59  It is not clear why the court thought 
this—it cited no legislative history or other material suggesting that 
Congress actually considered the question.  Nevertheless, as the court 
stated, its conclusion that the TDRA changed the standard was 
consistent with the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Starbucks Corp. v. 
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee Inc.,60 decided just over a year earlier.61 
It is unclear where Levi Strauss and Starbucks have left the issue of 
similarity.  As the Ninth Circuit stated, similarity continues to be a 
crucial element in analyzing dilution.62  If the two marks at issue are not 
 
 54. Id. at 1167.  The court noted that the Perfumebay.com case technically involved California 
law, and that California law had not then been amended to reflect the TDRA.  Id.  Regarding its 
subsequent Jada Toys decision, the court noted that because it found that the mark in question could 
have satisfied the identical or nearly identical standard (to defeat a motion for summary judgment), 
and because the court’s focus was on the change from actual dilution under the FTDA to likelihood 
of dilution under the TDRA, there was no need then to reexamine its standard.  Id. at 1168-69.  
Finally, as to its Visa opinion, the court stated that its reference to “nearly identical” was simply a 
factual statement about the apparent identity of the marks, not a comment on the proper legal 
standard.  Id. at 1170. 
 55. Id. at 1171 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 1172. 
 58. § 1125(c)(2)(B).   
 59. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1172, 1176. 
 60. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 61. The court then decided that the District Court’s application of the identical or nearly 
identical standard was not harmless error and remanded. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1173-74. 
 62. Id. at 1171 (“No doubt, similarity has a special role to play in the implementation of the 
new statute’s multifactor approach”).  This became apparent in the decision on remand in the 
Starbucks case.  The District Court noted the relative lack of similarity between the marks in context 
while deciding that there was no likelihood of dilution.  Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough 
7
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sufficiently similar, then there will be no association, or at least too weak 
an association, to be likely to cause any diminution of the distinctiveness 
of the famous mark.  However, the Levi Strauss and Starbucks approach 
probably will make it more difficult for dilution defendants to defeat the 
claim on a motion for summary judgment because the analysis will be 
more context driven. 
V.  THE TTAB ENTERS THE ARENA  
Starting in 1999, one could oppose an application to register a 
trademark with the Patent and Trademark Office on the grounds that the 
applicant’s mark may dilute the opposer’s (famous) mark.63  An 
opposition on those (or other) grounds would be brought before the 
PTO’s TTAB.64  Until 2010, the TTAB was a minor participant in the 
dilution game, issuing only two decisions of real consequence.65  Then, 
in 2010, the TTAB came alive, issuing five precedential dilution 
decisions that covered a range of issues.66 
Perhaps the most significant TTAB decision is National Pork 
Board v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Co.,67 in which the TTAB 
upheld a challenge based on blurring.68  The National Pork Board 
(NPB), owner of the slogan THE OTHER WHITE MEAT to promote 
pork, opposed Supreme Lobster and Seafood’s application to register 
THE OTHER RED MEAT for salmon.69 
In any dilution claim, the mark’s owner must prove that its mark is 
“famous”—that is, the mark is “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States.”70  In this case, NPB had its own 
 
Coffee, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5981(LTS)(THK), 2011 WL 6747431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) 
(citing a “minimal degree of similarity”). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2006).  See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: 
FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-18, 590 (Supp. 2011) (discussing the history of 
this provision). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2008). 
 65. NASDAQ Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Antartica, S.r.l., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (T.T.A.B. 
2003); Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164 (T.T.A.B. 2001). 
 66. Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, (T.T.A.B. 
2010); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning Servs., LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 
2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Am. Express Mktg. & 
Dev. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Fiat Grp. Autos. S.p.A v. 
ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. 
Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 67. Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479. 
 68. Id. at 1497.  
 69. Id. at 1481. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).  The mark normally must also be famous before the 
defendant’s first use of the mark.  However, in an intent to use registration case, the mark needs to 
8
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studies showing a very high degree of awareness as well as a study by 
Northwestern University, indicating a similar awareness of the slogan.71  
Based on this record, plus the fairly large advertising expenditures over a 
quarter century72 and third-party references,73 the TTAB found the mark 
to be famous.74 
Turning to the issue of blurring, the TTAB identified similarity as a 
crucial factor in the analysis.75  Unlike the Visa case, the marks here 
were not identical.76  Nevertheless, the differences between them were 
small (only one word) and they conjured up similar contexts, such as a 
comparison to other foods.  That, along with the high degree of 
association between the two slogans found by a survey, led the Board to 
find them “highly similar.”77  The TTAB then conducted an interesting 
analysis of the factor of degree of distinctiveness by looking almost 
exclusively at the degree of inherent distinctiveness possessed by the 
slogan.78  Although the TTAB did not explain its narrow focus, it 
appears that it assumed the more unique a mark was (as measured by 
inherent distinctiveness), the more likely it would be blurred by a highly 
similar mark.79  The other statutory factors for blurring80 were also found 
to favor NPB81 and actual association was shown by a survey.82  Thus, 
the Board found likely dilution by blurring.83 
 
be famous before the application for registration is filed.  See Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1490. 
 71. Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1490.  The TTAB rejected applicant’s attack on the 
methodology of the study.  Id.  The Board also held that a promotional slogan for a commodity 
could act as a trademark, even though it did not promote a particular source for the commodity.  Id. 
at 1493-94. 
 72. Id. at 1495.  The expenditures totaled almost $550 million.  Id.  
 73. Id. at 1496. 
 74. Id.   
 75. Id. at 1497. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 1497-98.  
 78. Id. at 1497.   
 79. Cf. Virgin Enters., Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that a highly 
inherently distinctive mark more likely to be confused with similar mark than less distinctive mark). 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006) lists the following factors: 
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.  
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.  
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially 
exclusive use of the mark.  
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.  
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the 
famous mark.  
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.  
Id. 
 81. Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1497-98. 
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An interesting contrast to National Pork Board is Coach Services, 
Inc. v. Triumph Learning Services, LLC,84 where handbag and accessory 
maker, Coach, opposed the registration of COACH as a mark for 
educational software.85  On its dilution claim, the TTAB found that 
Coach had not shown that its mark was famous.86  The TTAB found 
Coach’s brand awareness study not probative because of a lack of any 
witness to support its methodology.  The TTAB also found that the study 
itself only showed awareness among a limited audience, women between 
the ages of 13 and 24, and omitted not only other women, but men.87  
Nevertheless, the TTAB finished the dilution analysis and concluded 
that the factors did not favor a finding of dilution by blurring.  The 
TTAB determined the two marks were dissimilar “because of their 
distinct meanings and commercial impressions,” the lack of evidence of 
intent to create an association, and there was no evidence of actual 
association between the marks.88 
A third important decision, American Express Marketing & 
Development Corp. v. Gilad Development Corp.,89 involved the use of 
the statutory exclusions from dilution.90  When American Express 
opposed the registration of GRAND AMERICAN EXPRESS 
CLEVELAND AND COLUMBUS, the applicant claimed, among other 
things, that it was protected by the non-commercial use exclusion of the 
TDRA.91  However, the TTAB ruled that the non-commercial use 
exclusion cannot be invoked by an applicant in an opposition 
proceeding.92  The courts’ primary basis for this ruling was that an 
“applicant cannot claim non-commercial use of its marks when it is 
required to demonstrate use of its marks in commerce as service marks 
 
 82. Id. at 1497.   
 83. Id. at 1498.  In one other interesting twist, the TTAB declined to discuss the opposer’s 
alternate ground of likelihood of confusion.  Id.  Normally, the TTAB operates in reverse; it reviews 
the confusion ground, then declines to discuss dilution when it finds confusion.  Id.  “Because we 
have found for opposer in connection with its likelihood of dilution claim, we do not reach its claim 
of likelihood of confusion.” Id. 
 84. Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 
2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012). 
 85. Id. at 1601. 
 86. Id. at 1611. 
 87. Id.  Here, it is relevant to note that the TDRA requires that a famous mark be widely 
recognized by the “general consuming public.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
 88.  Coach, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1614-15. 
 89. Am. Express Mktg. & Dev. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (T.T.A.B. 
2010). 
 90. Id. at 1296; see § 1125(c)(3)(A)-(C). 
 91. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
 92. Am. Express, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1298. 
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[or trademarks] in order to obtain federal registrations.”93  Although this 
will normally be true, and was in this case, it may not always be true.  
First of all, in any dilution claim, to be actionable, the unauthorized use 
must be a “use in commerce.”94  The TTAB’s conclusion would appear 
to make the non-commercial use exclusion superfluous.  Second, 
Congress specifically limited another exclusion, the “fair use” exclusion, 
to non-trademark uses.95  Thus, non-commercial uses most likely include 
some trademark uses as well.  Finally, a “use in commerce” may still be 
a “noncommercial use.”96  Interpreting the original FTDA, the Ninth 
Circuit found “commercial use in commerce” to be different than 
“noncommercial use.”97  It stands to reason that a “use in commerce” 
could also include “non-commercial uses.”  Nevertheless, it would be a 
rare circumstance in which an applicant legitimately could assert that its 
use will be non-commercial.98 
In a fourth case, Fiat Group Automobiles, S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc.,99 an 
opposer, who did not even use its mark in the United States, claimed that 
the applicant’s proposed PANDA mark would cause dilution of the its 
mark.  The opposer, Fiat, sells automobiles in the United States.100  It 
does not, however, sell a PANDA automobile or any other PANDA 
product in the United States.101  Can a mark not used in this country 
claim dilution protection in this situation? 
It is a source of contention whether a mark not used in this country 
can claim any protection under federal trademark law.102  The TTAB did 
not need to resolve the problem, although its opinion leaves tantalizing 
clues about its intentions.  As we have seen, a plaintiff or opposer must 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. § 1125(a)(1). 
 95. § 1125(c)(3)(A). 
 96. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903-06 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1171 (2003). 
 97. Id. at 903-04. 
 98. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 63, at 605.  
 99. Fiat Grp. Autos. S.p.A v. ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
 100. Id. at 1111. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Compare ITC, Ltd v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating no 
protection under Lanham Act for mark not used in U.S.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007), with 
Grupo Gigante, S.A. de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing 
protection from confusion for mark not used but well-known in a portion of the United States, 
remanded to determine if it met the well-known marks exception & the court held so far Plaintiff 
had not met its burden to establish protection of the mark).  See also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 
880 N.E.2d 852, 859 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that a mark not used in the United States may claim 
protection under New York unfair competition law). 
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have a “famous” mark to be eligible for dilution protection.103  The 
TDRA’s definition of a famous mark specifically requires that it be 
widely recognized by consumers in the United States.104  The TTAB 
interpreted this to mean that the mark must be “used” in the United 
States, although not necessarily in a manner sufficient to create 
trademark rights in the United States.105  Thus, a “use analogous to 
trademark use” (e.g., advertising) could be sufficient if it created 
sufficient renown among U.S. consumers.106  Also, filing an Intent to 
Use application would suffice, again assuming the requisite recognition 
among U.S. consumers.107  But then, the TTAB opened the door to 
eligibility a bit wider, by assuming the “possibility” that a mark not used 
at all might obtain the requisite recognition for fame.108  However, it did 
not need to go further, because the evidence in Fiat’s case was 
insufficient under any measurement of recognition.109 
Finally, the TTAB considered the required degree of similarity 
between the litigants’ uses in Citigroup, Inc. v. Capital City Bank 
Group, Inc.110  Although the Second Circuit had just held that the TDRA 
mandated no specific level of similarity,111 the TTAB thought that a 
significant degree of similarity was necessary if the process of dilution 
was to occur—that is, if consumers would see the same mark as 
signifying two different sources.112  The TTAB continued to apply this 
standard in the Coach case.113 
 
 103. See supra notes 70, 74, 80, 86, and 87 and accompanying text. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (“. . . mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of 
the mark’s owner.”). 
 105. Fiat Grp. Autos. S.p.A v. ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1115 (T.T.A.B. 2010). 
 106. Id. at 1114-15. 
 107. Id. at 1115. 
 108. Id. at 1114 n.5. 
 109. Id. at 1115. 
 110. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (T.T.A.B. 
2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 111. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2009).  As 
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its “identical or nearly identical” standard of 
similarity in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach.  Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1611 (9th Cir. 2011), discussed supra text accompanying notes 49-62.  
But this took place after the TTAB’s decision. 
 112. Citigroup, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1667.  Note that the TTAB found a “high degree” of 
similarity in the National Pork Board case when it found a likelihood of dilution.  Id.  In this case, 
the degree of similarity was insufficient to support a finding of dilution.  Id.  But see Nike, Inc. v. 
Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (adopting the Starbucks-Levi Strauss 
approach). 
 113. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning Servs., Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1613 
(T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012). 
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VI.  BEYOND DILUTION:  CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY 
In 2010, the Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.114  Although there was a collateral dilution 
issue in the case, the main issues involved infringement, particularly 
contributory infringement.115  
Tiffany claimed that a sizeable percentage of Tiffany branded 
merchandise sold on eBay is counterfeit.116  Tiffany alleged that eBay 
obtained fees from merchants who sold counterfeits.  Tiffany alleged 
also that eBay promoted Tiffany merchandise sales through 
advertisements on eBay’s web site and through “sponsored links” 
advertisements on search engines such as Yahoo or Google.117  Thus, 
Tiffany claimed both direct infringement (through the sponsored links 
and eBay website advertising) and contributory infringement (by 
facilitating the sales on eBay).118  The court easily rejected the direct 
infringement claim, noting that long-standing precedent permitted eBay 
to advertise sales of branded merchandise as long as the advertising is 
truthful and does not suggest any endorsement by the brand owner.119  
That left the contributory infringement claim.120 
Turning to the contributory infringement claim, the court applied 
the test formulated by the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.121  The Inwood test gives two possible bases 
for contributory liability:  (1) intentionally inducing the direct infringer 
to infringe a mark, or (2) “continu[ing] to supply its [services] to one 
whom [defendant] knows or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement.”122  It was clear that the first base of the test did 
not apply, leaving the “knowing or having reason to know” as the basis 
for any liability.123  Tiffany’s case did not rely on those sellers whose 
 
 114. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010). 
 115. Id. at 112-13.  As to direct liability for dilution, the court found no use of a second mark 
by eBay that would dilute Tiffany’s mark.  Id.  The other dilution issue involved contributory 
liability.  Id.  The court found the doctrine of contributory dilution questionable but in any case 
unfounded on the facts of the case.  Id.  
 116. Id. at 97. 
 117. Id. at 100-01. 
 118. Id. at 101-04. 
 119. Id. at 101-03. 
 120. Id. at 105.  A preliminary issue was whether contributory infringement applied to the act 
of providing services to the direct infringer, rather than supplying products.  Id.  However, eBay 
abandoned that issue on appeal.  See id. at 105-06. 
 121. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 122. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106 (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854). 
 123. Id.  
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activities Tiffany specifically brought to eBay’s attention as sellers of 
counterfeits.124  Instead, its core claim was that eBay had sufficient 
knowledge that sellers of Tiffany-branded merchandise were 
predominantly selling counterfeits, which deemed eBay complicit and 
contributorily liable if it did not stop the sale of Tiffany-branded items 
on eBay.125  Tiffany pointed to the many notices of actual counterfeits it 
provided to eBay, the complaints to eBay from buyers and the results of 
a Tiffany buying program that it provided to eBay to support this 
claim.126  The key question was whether such generalized knowledge of 
widespread counterfeit sales, as opposed to specific knowledge of 
particular infringing sales, was sufficient to create liability. 127  The 
Second Circuit, agreeing with the District Court, held that “a service 
provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know 
that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods.”128  Interestingly, 
the Second Circuit drew on a Supreme Court copyright case, the well-
known Sony v. Universal Studios case,129 for support.  In Sony, the Court 
compared the Inwood standard to the standard used for contributory 
liability in copyright cases, stating that the Inwood standard was 
narrower and required knowledge of specific infringing individuals.130  
This persuaded the Second Circuit that generalized knowledge did not 
satisfy Inwood.131  Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the 
court found that the general knowledge of counterfeiting supplied by 
Tiffany was insufficient to impose contributory liability on eBay.132 
But this finding did not end matters.  In an important additional 
section, the court held that a service provider may not “intentionally 
 
 124. Id.  Tiffany did so claim in the District Court, which rejected the allegations, primarily 
because eBay promptly terminated those listings, and often those sellers’ accounts, once given 
information that they were selling counterfeits.  Id.  However, Tiffany abandoned that claim on 
appeal, and the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement with the District Court’s ruling.  Id.  
 125. Id. at 107. 
 126. Id. at 106. 
 127. Id. at 106-07.  Such as the ones by sellers that Tiffany identified to eBay.  Id. 
 128. Id. at 107. 
 129. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 130. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 108 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 500 (1984)). 
 131. Id. at 107. 
 132. Id. at 109.  See also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546-49 (E.D. 
Va. 2010) (providing another example of online trademark use where Google’s sale of trademarks 
for comparative advertising was found not to be contributorily infringing) (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d 
at 109); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1187 (D. Utah 2010) (holding 
an advertiser defendant was not contributorily liable for infringing ads used by some of its 10,000 
affiliates unless it had specific knowledge of the identities of the infringers) (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d 
at 109).  See infra text accompanying notes 152-211. 
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shield[] itself from discovering” the identities of the direct infringers.133  
However, the court found that eBay used significant efforts to combat 
counterfeit sales and did not become willfully blind to the identity of 
such sellers.134 
Although eBay advertised the availability of Tiffany-branded 
merchandise on its website, the Second Circuit disagreed with the 
District Court regarding Tiffany’s claim of false advertising.135  The 
court found that this advertising was not literally false because there 
were genuine Tiffany articles for sale,136 and the Second Circuit found 
that at this stage of the litigation, it could not say definitively that the 
advertisements did not mislead consumers into believing that all of the 
Tiffany merchandise for sale on eBay was genuine.137  However, the 
court also noted that a disclaimer may suffice to make the ads truthful; 
an investigation into the genuineness of each item for sale was not 
required.138 
In terms of contributory liability, Tiffany ultimately breaks little 
new doctrinal ground.  However, its strong affirmation of the need for 
specific knowledge is an important statement.139  As the court noted, 
European courts have been more favorably disposed toward trademark 
owners.140  Thus, Tiffany illustrates an important distinction between 
U.S. law and European law.  Moreover, it appears that the court was 
concerned about allowing a trademark owner to eliminate competition in 
the aftermarket for its goods.141  That competitive concern is consistent 
with recent Supreme Court opinions in trademark law.142  From a 
practical standpoint, the requirement that for online auctioneers and 
other intermediaries to be held liable they must have specific 
information about infringement, means that imposing contributory 
liability on such defendants will be very difficult.143  On the cautionary 
side for defendants, however, is the court’s treatment of the issue of 
willful blindness.144  In this case, eBay took great pains and spent a lot of 
 
 133. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109. 
 134. Id. at 110. 
 135. Id. at 113. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 114. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 107.   
 140. Id. at 105 n.9 (citing various cases and articles). 
 141. See id. at 103. 
 142. See generally David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New 
Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659 (2004). 
 143. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107-09. 
 144. Id. at 109. 
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money to minimize sales of counterfeits.145  It is unclear what would be 
required of less well-financed defendants faced with similar or 
analogous allegations. 
As an aside, another case reminds us that contributory liability 
requires that there be direct infringement.146  In Georgia-Pacific 
Consumer Products, LP v. Myers Supply, Inc.,147 a case involving paper 
towel dispensers and paper towels, the court held that consumers would 
not be confused by the use of towels not made by the manufacturer of 
the dispenser, hence no contributory (or direct) infringement.148 
VII.  ADWORDS ………… AGAIN! 
Google’s AdWords program is a seemingly endless source of 
trademark cases.  It sparked a lively debate about whether the sale of 
trademarked words to competitors of trademark owners to trigger 
displays of competitive advertising constitutes a “use in commerce” 
under the Lanham Act.149  Lately, AdWords cases have largely moved 
beyond preliminary skirmishes to the issue of whether the program is, in 
fact, likely to cause confusion.  Two district court cases in the past year 
provide interesting and, in one case, quite novel analyses of the problem:  
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc. 150 and 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
Lens.com, Inc.151 
Rosetta Stone raised a variety of trademark issues, from direct 
infringement to contributory and vicarious liability,152 to functionality 
and even dilution.153   
As to infringement, the court analyzed the issue under the Fourth 
Circuit’s multifactor test; however, it focused on only three of the 
factors:  Google’s intent, evidence of actual confusion, and “the 
consuming public’s sophistication.”154  Regarding intent, the court 
 
 145. See id. at 98-100 (discussing eBay’s efforts). 
 146. Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 773-76 (noting that the Fourth Circuit previously denied defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment in a similar case involving the same plaintiff, see Ga.-Pac., 618 F.3d 441.  
However, the Eighth Circuit noted that the case before it involved a bench trial, not a denial of 
summary judgment.  Ga.-Pac., 621 F.3d at 775-76. 
 149. See, e.g., Rescuecom  Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-30 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 150. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 151. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Utah 2010). 
 152. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41.  Vicarious liability imposes liability on 
defendant for the act of another over whom defendant is responsible.  Id.  Contributory liability 
imposes liability for defendant’s own acts inducing or aiding the direct infringement of another.  Id. 
 153. Id. at 534-35. 
 154. Id. at 540-41. 
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rejected Rosetta Stone’s assertion that Google’s desire to profit from the 
sale of trademarks as search keywords demonstrated intent to confuse.155  
Rather, the court distinguished an intent to profit (which Google had) 
from an intent to confuse (which it did not have).156  In this case, the 
court noted that causing confusion was antithetical to Google’s business 
interests.157  Google wants users to obtain useful information from 
searches and would be harmed if the links it provides lead users astray or 
lead to purchases of counterfeit goods.158  Turning to actual confusion, 
the court noted that Rosetta Stone relied on precedent that related to a 
significantly different situation—a competitive goods case (Rosetta 
Stone and Google do not compete) and a 30-40% rate of consumer 
confusion.  Here, the confusion was experienced by only five people out 
of more than 100,000 displays, a sum the court termed de minimis.159  
Significantly, all of the confused individuals knew that they were not 
purchasing from Rosetta Stone, although they did believe that Rosetta 
Stone produced the program they bought.160  Rosetta Stone’s other 
evidence of confusion was considered inadequate as well.161  Most 
interesting was the court’s rejection of evidence of possible confusion of 
endorsement by Google of Rosetta Stone.162  Finally, the court found 
that given the cost of Rosetta Stone’s program and the goal of the 
purchase, learning a foreign language, potential consumers were likely 
to be sophisticated, which pointed away from confusion.163  Thus, the 
court found no direct infringement by Google and granted summary 
judgment on this issue.164 
Most notable was the court’s next topic, functionality.165  If a 
trademark is “functional,” then it is not protected.166  Normally, 
functionality is associated with a physical feature, such as shape, color, 
 
 155. Id. at 541. 
 156. Id. at 542. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  The court also noted that a revision of Google’s trademark policy was tied to an 
automation of its system for verifying sponsored links before they are displayed, not to any desire to 
cause confusion.  Id.  
 159. Id. at 542-43.  Moreover, the confused individuals viewed advertisements that did not 
conform to Google’s policies and purchased counterfeit items.  Id. 
 160. Id. at 543-44. 
 161. Id. at 544.  Much of it was complaints about counterfeits, none of which came through 
Google.  Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 545. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. 
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or design, which gives the product a competitive advantage.  This is 
reflected in the test for functionality:  “if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”167  
In this case, the court found functionality based on the fact that the sale 
of trademarked words is essential to the operation (“cost or quality”) of 
Google’s AdWords program, as it generates needed revenue and 
provides useful competitive advertising.168  This is a highly unusual use 
of functionality—one that was apparently rejected by the Ninth Circuit 
in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.169  
Normally, functionality turns on whether the feature gives the plaintiff a 
market advantage not derived from its brand reputation.  Here, the court 
focused on the detriment to Google without regard to its ability to 
compete against Rosetta Stone.170  It will be worth watching how the 
Fourth Circuit addresses this issue. 
Rosetta Stone’s other arguments were similarly unavailing.171  The 
court applied the Second Circuit’s decision in Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, 
Inc.172 and found neither inducement nor a continuing sale of keywords 
with specific knowledge that the purchaser sold counterfeit 
merchandise.173  Following the Second Circuit’s lead, the court found 
that generalized knowledge of counterfeit sales from sponsored links 
was insufficient, and Rosetta Stone’s evidence of specific knowledge 
was insufficient as well.174  The related argument of vicarious liability 
was rejected on the grounds that Google did not exercise control over the 
advertisers simply by having a financial relationship with them.175 
Finally, the court disposed of Rosetta Stone’s dilution claims on 
three grounds.176  First, it found that Google’s use was a fair use, thus 
excluded by section 43(c)(3)(A).177  That section excludes “[a]ny fair use 
. . . of a famous mark . . . .”178  The court apparently viewed Google’s 
use as one involving “advertising or promotion that permits consumers 
 
 167. Id. (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)). 
 168. Id. at 546. 
 169. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
 170. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010).  This decision is discussed supra text accompanying notes 114-45. 
 173. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546-49. 
 174. Id. at 548-49. 
 175. Id. at 549-50. 
 176. Id. at 550-52. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006)). 
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to compare goods or services.”179  Second, the court noted that, in 
conformance with the statutory exclusion, Google did not use the 
Rosetta Stone mark as its own trademark.180  Finally, the court found 
that since Google’s use began, the awareness of Rosetta Stone’s mark 
had increased, obviating any claim of impairment of its distinctiveness.  
As a result, there was no evidence of harm to the mark owner’s 
reputation resulting from the sales of counterfeit goods.181  The dilution 
claim was rejected.182 
The 1-800 Contacts case is interesting because, unlike Rosetta 
Stone, it involved a suit by the mark owner against the competitor who 
purchased the trademark as a keyword.183  Moreover, this case involved 
uses on search engines in addition to Google.184  The court addressed 
several important issues:  use in commerce, direct infringement, and 
secondary liability.185 
As to use in commerce, the court sided with the other courts that 
have found the purchase of keywords to be a use in commerce, 
notwithstanding the fact that the trademark may not be displayed in the 
sponsored link.186  With regard to confusion, the court held that there 
was no direct infringement by confusion resulting from defendant’s 
purchase of keywords.187  Most notably, the court disagreed with the 
plaintiff’s characterization of defendant’s use as a “bait and switch.”  
The court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,188 which used 
the same characterization where defendant used plaintiff’s mark in a 
metatag, represented a misunderstanding of the functioning of search 
engines.189  The court cited the many possible choices that appear on a 
search engine’s results page and stated that “[w]hen the link does not 
incorporate a competitor’s mark ‘in any way discernable to internet users 
 
 179. Id. at 550-51 (citing § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 552. 
 183. 1-800 Contact Lens Inc v. Lens.com Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1158 (D. Utah 2010). 
 184. Id. at 1163-65. 
 185. Id. at 1157. 
 186. Id. at 1170.  See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 187. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d. at 1181-82. 
 188. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 189. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73.  The Brookfield  opinion found “initial 
interest confusion” as a result of the “bait and switch.”  Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1162.  More 
recently, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Brookfield in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced 
System Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2011) in a manner that hinted that 
criticisms of Brookfield may be gaining traction in that court. 
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and potential customers,’ there is ‘no opportunity to confuse . . . .’”190  
The court further stated that imposing liability “would result in an anti-
competitive, monopolistic protection, to which [plaintiff] is not 
entitled.”191  Thus, the mere use of plaintiff’s trademark to trigger a 
linked ad could not be deemed infringing.192  When the court analyzed 
the factors of confusion, it found that sponsored links not containing 
plaintiff’s mark were not likely to cause confusion.193  However, some 
advertisements generated by defendant’s affiliates did contain plaintiff’s 
mark and, as to those, the court found likely confusion.194  The 
“affiliates” were not necessarily entities known to defendant, however, 
leading to the discussion of secondary liability.195 
In an analysis similar to that of Rosetta Stone,196 the court 
concluded that defendant did not exercise control over the wording of 
the affiliate’s advertisement and, therefore, could not be held vicariously 
liable to those acts.197  Furthermore, there was no evidence of 
inducement, thus eliminating one branch of contributory liability.198  As 
to the second branch—continuing to deal with the infringer with 
knowledge (“know or should have known”) of its infringement—only a 
small subset of the affiliate ads directly infringed.199  Also, the plaintiff 
failed to provide sufficient information for defendant to identify the 
infringers.200  Defendant had taken steps to identify the offenders after 
the suit was brought, but the court found that it lacked sufficient 
information to do so and to stop the infringement.201  This result is 
consistent with both Rosetta Stone202 and Tiffany,203 which refused to 
impose liability based on generalized knowledge of infringement by 
others.204 
 
 190. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (quoting J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C Ltd. P’ship. 
v. Settlement Funding, LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4 
2007)). 
 191. Id. at 1174. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 1175. 
 194. Id. at 1182. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 549 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 197. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. at 1183-84. 
 198. Id. at 1185. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 1186-87. 
 201. Id. at 1187. 
 202. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 203. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
647 (2010). 
 204. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-87. 
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Thus far, while courts appear to be finding the purchase of 
keywords to satisfy the use in commerce requirement, they are not 
inclined to impose liability on Google or its advertisers.  An exception 
may be where the sponsored link displays plaintiff’s mark in a confusing 
manner, and then liability would only be on the offending advertiser. 
Google also triumphed, at least partly, in Europe, although on 
different grounds.205  In Google France S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton 
Malletier,206 the European Court of Justice held that the sale of 
trademarks as keywords was not a “use in the course of trade,” and 
therefore was not actionable for confusion under European trademark 
law.207 
VIII.  RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND THE “COMMERCIALIZATION” 
OF AN IMAGE 
Rights of publicity, which might be called a form of individual 
branding, raise numerous issues, some of which are unique, others of 
which are infused with issues from trademark and copyright.  The 
problems in this area are compounded by the primacy of non-uniform 
state laws, as opposed to federal laws which are applicable in most other 
areas of intellectual property.  Over the past year or so, several cases 
have tested the divide between using the celebrity image as an 
informational vehicle, which is normally considered protected speech, 
and using it as a commercial vehicle, which is normally actionable.  This 
balancing act is not a new one, but recent cases present it in some new 
and interesting ways.   
A good example of the problem was Keller v. Electronic Arts, 
Inc.208  Keller challenged the unauthorized use by Electronic Arts (EA) 
of the likenesses of various college football players in a video game.209  
Under California law, which applied to Keller’s claim against EA, one 
key is whether the use is considered “transformative,” in which case it is 
 
 205. Case C-236/08, Google France S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. 30. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.  However, the ECJ held that the advertiser’s purchase of the keyword was a “use in the 
course of trade” and thus potentially actionable.  Id.  If the advertiser were to be liable even in the 
absence of confusion, then the AdWords program would not work.  European law allows an 
infringement claim if one makes an unauthorized use of a mark that is identical to a registered mark.  
Id. 
 208. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 209. Id. at 1132.  EA actually licensed the use, but not from the players; it obtained a license 
from the National Collegiate Athletic Association and Collegiate Licensing Company.  EA did not 
use the actual names of the athletes in the game, though consumers may be able to obtain that 
information online and input it into the game.  Id. at 1132. 
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fully protected by the First Amendment.210  Here, the court held that the 
use was not sufficiently transformative to claim protection.211  The court 
stressed the realism of the video game setting and the close copying of 
plaintiff’s virtual identity as a quarterback at Arizona State University 
into the game.212  The court also rejected the argument that the game, 
broadly speaking, was transformative, focusing instead on its depiction 
of the plaintiffs.213  This emphasis on realism tracked the California 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup,214 
where the court upheld a claim where the use was considered a literal 
depiction of the Three Stooges in a photographic manner (although the 
use was not a photograph, but a drawing) on lithographs and t-shirts.215  
The use in Keller, however, extends Saderup because each depiction is 
not sold by itself.216  Rather, the various player depictions are part of a 
larger whole in which each player is a relatively small component.217 
The court then turned to the asserted public interest defense.218  EA 
compared its use to the use of major league player names and statistics, 
video clips, and game programs on the Major League Baseball web 
site.219  However, the court found the comparison to what it termed 
“presentations of historical data” with a video game inapposite.220  The 
court also distinguished a more commercial use, the use of player names 
and statistics in fantasy leagues,221 which the Eighth Circuit permitted in 
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P.222  Here, the distinction was less clear; the court thought that 
because EA’s game used “the virtual players,” there was a significant 
difference in the analysis, though it did not explain why.223 
 
 210. Id. at 1134.  See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 25 Cal. 4th 387, 406-09 (2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
 211. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1134. 
 212. Id.   
 213. Id.   
 214. Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th 387. 
 215. Id. at 407-09.   
 216. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1135.  In a later case, on very similar facts, a district court in 
New Jersey ruled that the use in a video game was transformative.  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., Civil 
Action No. 09–cv–5990 (FLW), 2011 WL 4005350 (D.N.J. 2011).  Unlike Keller, Hart was decided 
on a more complete record.  Id.  at *24 (noting the difference). 
 217. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1135.  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at 1136.  See Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001). 
 220. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1136. 
 221. Id. 
 222. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1090 (2008). 
 223. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1136. 
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A related issue was discussed in Dryer v. National Football 
League,224 where former football players sued the NFL for using video 
footage from games as part of a series of videos used to promote the 
NFL.225  As in Keller, the primary issue was whether the defendant’s 
actions were protected speech.226  In Dryer, the court viewed the 
problem as whether the use would be considered commercial speech, 
which would give it less protection than ordinary speech.227  The issue of 
commercial speech and rights of publicity is not new.  The Ninth Circuit 
discussed the issue in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,228 and took a 
narrow view of commercial speech—that it is speech that “does not 
more than propose a commercial transaction.”229  However, courts have 
not always agreed on the proper definition of commercial speech.  The 
Dryer court chose to use a three-part test derived from an Eighth Circuit 
case,230 which looks at (1) whether the speech in question is an 
advertisement, (2) whether it refers to a specific product or service, and 
(3) the economic motivation of the speaker.231  Although the Eighth 
Circuit had previously held that using player names and statistics in a 
fantasy league was protected speech,232 the Dryer court believed that 
those cases were distinguishable.233  The court asserted that the prior 
cases only used “information [that] was already in the public domain.”234  
The court also distinguished the California Court of Appeal ruling in 
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball,235 in which the court dismissed a 
claim that Major League Baseball’s use of photographs and video clips 
on its web site violated plaintiff’s right of publicity, notwithstanding the 
promotional aspect of the use.236  Although it acknowledged the 
similarity of the two cases, the Dryer court stated that “the Gionfriddo 
court did not consider or comment on whether the challenged uses . . . 
constituted an advertisement for the purposes of the commercial speech 
 
 224. Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 225. Id. at 1115. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1116. 
 228. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 229. Id. at 1184. 
 230. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 231. See Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-19. 
 232. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1090 (2008).  Accord CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 233. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001). 
 236. Id. at 411-14. 
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inquiry.”237  Thus, the court denied the NFL’s motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.238 
Keller and Dryer indicate that courts may be inclined to protect 
rights of publicity where the use is a mixture of information and 
promotion or commerciality.239  However, both cases were decided on 
the pleadings, not on a full record, and only held that the plaintiffs had 
stated a claim.240  Therefore, one must read them with a certain amount 
of caution.  Additionally, the courts of appeals have yet to be heard from 
in these cases.  They are worth watching. 
IX.  POSTSCRIPT:  BOOP BOOP BE DOOP, OR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
TRADEMARK TWO-STEP 
In early 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Fleischer 
Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.241 that looked to be a significant revival 
and expansion of the aesthetic functionality doctrine the court discussed 
more than thirty years before in International Order of Job’s Daughters 
v. Lindeburg & Co.242  Fleischer involved the copyright and trademark 
rights to the Betty Boop character and name, created in 1930.243  On the 
issue of trademark rights, the Ninth Circuit held that Job’s Daughters 
was “directly applicable” to the case.244  Because defendant was using 
the Betty Boop character as ornamentation (or as the product itself) for 
its own aesthetic value, not as a source identifier for defendant’s goods, 
the court held the use to be aesthetically functional.245  Potentially, 
Fleischer could have rendered many uses of images and characters (e.g., 
Mickey Mouse) non-infringing (assuming the absence of a valid 
copyright!).  Fleischer also leads to interesting questions about the 
distinction between this use of aesthetic functionality and the rejection of 
 
 237. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
 238. Id. at 1121. 
 239. Note that, as of this writing, the Keller decision is on appeal, and the issue of rights of 
publicity of college athletes is the subject of a multi-plaintiff, multidistrict litigation.  See In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09–1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 
(N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011). 
 240. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Dryer, 689 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1115. 
 241. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 242. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 243. Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1117. 
 244. Id. at 1124. 
 245. Id.  The court also cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), for the proposition that trademark law cannot be used 
to preclude a copyrighted image from entering the public domain.  Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1124-25. 
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the application of that doctrine in Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen 
of America, Inc.246  Though the two cases are potentially 
distinguishable—Fleischer involved a character,247 whereas Au-
Tomotive Gold involved a word (and logo) mark248—discerning the 
boundaries of the two cases would have been an interesting task for 
lower courts. 
However, that problem was avoided when the Ninth Circuit 
subsequently withdrew the opinion, replacing it with one that came to 
almost the same result but on a different rationale (at least for the 
trademark claims).249  The new opinion held that plaintiff’s evidence of 
trademark registration of the image was untimely, and that its evidence 
of secondary meaning was legally insufficient.250  The court then found 
issues of fact remaining on the issue of validity and infringement of the 
word mark “Betty Boop,” and remanded to the district court.251  Thus, 
the aesthetic functionality issue must await another day, although the 
original opinion is a tantalizing preview of a possible future opinion. 
 
 246. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 247. Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1117. 
 248. Au-Tomotive, 457 F.3d at 1064.  See also Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1173-74 (“there is no 
evidence that consumers buy Auto Gold’s products solely because of their ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic 
appeal.  Instead, the alleged aesthetic function is indistinguishable from and tied to the mark’s 
source-identifying nature”). 
 249. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2011).  Apparently, 
a motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was made, but mooted by the new opinion.  Id. at 960. 
 250. Id. at 966.  The court held that without the presumption of validity afforded by 
registration, plaintiff had to show secondary meaning.  Id.  The court offered no explanation for why 
the image could not be inherently distinctive, although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), could be the answer. 
 251. A.V.E.L.A., 654 F.3d at 968.  
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